The Political Economic Determinants of Nuclear Power Investment: Evidence from Chernobyl (with Nancy Qian and Shaoda Wang)
Abstract
This paper investigates the political-economic determinants of nuclear energy investment using the Chernobyl accident as a natural experiment. We document several facts. First, Chernobyl reduced worldwide growth in the number of nuclear power plants. Second, the reduction is driven by increased construction delays in democracies and results in the prolonged use of older and less safe plants. Third, the nuclear growth slowdown in democracies is more pronounced in the presence of large fossil fuel reserves. Finally, nuclear plant capacity reduces coal-fired power plants and air pollution. The results for the UK parliament and the US Congress provide suggestive evidence that lobbying by energy groups was an important driver of the reduction in nuclear energy investment in democracies and, in the long run, likely undermined efforts to increase nuclear energy safety and moderate climate change.
About this workshop
The Political Economy + AI seminar is an online seminar focused on political economy research using AI and computational methods. We welcome work in progress and methods talks on these topics.
Formerly the Public Governance working group, the seminar is organized jointly by King's College London and Université Paris-Dauphine – PSL.
More information can be found on the website of the Political Economy + AI seminar.
Periodicity: Mondays from 17h30 to 18h30 (Paris time).